Data reveal the Jalisco Cartel’s homicide monopoly gripping Mexico: CJNG now claims 77% of all cartel-related murders since 2017, reshaping the nation’s violence map.
A decade ago, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) set out on a ruthless drive to seize territory and export markets. Today, it stands as a self-styled “war machine” that dominates cartel violence nationwide. Recent figures from Uppsala University’s Department of Peace and Conflict Research show that between 2017 and 2023, Mexican cartels tallied 94,021 murders. Of those, CJNG accounts for 72,639—fully 77.2 percent of all organized-crime killings over that period.
Before 2017, organized-crime homicides in Mexico never exceeded 6,000 cases in a year. Then they jumped to 9,723. By 2021, cartel-linked murders peaked at 16,934. The CJNG’s share exploded, rising from 1,403 homicides in 2016 to 5,528 in 2017, then surging to 13,307 by 2020. Although its toll eased slightly—12,832 in 2021, 10,631 in 2022, and 9,844 in 2023—it still far outpaces every rival.
Experts link the violence spike to Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán’s 2017 extradition to the United States. His removal weakened the Sinaloa Cartel’s grip and opened the path for CJNG to expand unchecked.
“Since 2017, CJNG decided to expand. They invaded Zacatecas, Aguascalientes, Guanajuato, and Michoacán,” says David Saucedo, a national-security analyst. “They later moved into Tabasco, Chiapas, Baja California, and Chihuahua. This turned the cartel into a war machine.” Saucedo adds that CJNG uses violence as a deliberate tactic to “devour municipalities.”
Today, CJNG fronts clash with La Barredora in Tabasco, the Sinaloa Cartel in Chiapas and Zacatecas, Santa Rosa de Lima in Guanajuato, and the United Cartels in Michoacán. Each confrontation drives murder rates higher, cementing CJNG’s lethal brand.
Uppsala’s Conflict Data Programme maps CJNG’s violence across three regions. In the central-west—mainly Guanajuato and Jalisco—it records 60,583 cartel killings. The northern zone, dominated by Tijuana, tallies 15,082. In the south, it logs 2,118. These pockets reflect CJNG’s priorities and reveal how its deadly push has reshaped Mexico’s crime map.
In January, the U.S. State Department branded CJNG one of six terrorist organizations, granting Washington legal grounds for tougher action. The 2025 National Drug Threat Assessment from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) names CJNG “one of Mexico’s most powerful, influential, and ruthless transnational criminal organizations,” and a key source of illicit fentanyl entering the United States.
The DEA notes CJNG’s reach extends to more than 40 countries. It credits the cartel’s growth to vast finances, a franchise-based command structure, habitual violence, and the cultivation of corrupt officials.
The DEA warns that a potential CJNG alliance with the Sinaloa Cartel’s Los Chapitos faction could tilt Mexico’s criminal balance. Such a pact might boost drug flows northward and arms trafficking southward across the U.S.–Mexico border.
When asked whether President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s “hugs, not bullets” approach fueled CJNG’s rise, Saucedo disagrees. “They ran in parallel without clear links,” he says. He notes that under U.S. pressure, Mexico resumed extraditions and high-profile arrests, diluting any passive drug-policy impact.
As CJNG cements its homicide monopoly, Mexican authorities face mounting challenges. Analysts urge a blend of targeted law enforcement, regional cooperation, and social investment to undercut cartel power. Without decisive action, CJNG’s war machine may keep Mexico on a deadlier trajectory—and extend its lethal reach well beyond the border.
Data reveal the Jalisco Cartel’s homicide monopoly gripping Mexico: CJNG now claims 77% of all cartel-related murders since 2017, reshaping the nation’s violence map.
